eprintid: 44429
rev_number: 11
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/04/44/29
datestamp: 2024-04-17 06:18:51
lastmod: 2024-04-22 06:51:41
status_changed: 2022-02-16 00:00:36
type: article
succeeds: 44428
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Aubert, Cécile
creators_name: Ding, Huihui
creators_id: Cecile.Aubert@ut-capitole.fr
creators_idrefppn: 07594717X
creators_affiliation: Toulouse School of Economics
creators_halaffid: 1002422
title: Voter conformism and inefficient policies
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: A reelection-seeking politician makes a policy decision that can reveal her private information on whether her political orientation and capabilities will be a good fit to future circumstances. We study how she may choose inappropriate policies to hide her information, even in the absence of specific conflicts of interests, and how voters’ conformism affects her incentives to do so. Conformism is independent from policies and from voters’ perceptions; yet we identify a ‘conformism advantage’ for the incumbent that exists only when there is also an incumbency advantage. Conformism changes the incentives of the incumbent and favors the emergence of an efficient, separating equilibrium. It may even eliminate the pooling equi-librium (that can consist in inefficient persistence). Conformism has a mixed impact on social welfare however: it improves policy choices and the information available to independent vot-ers, but fosters inefficient reelection in the face of a stronger opponent. When the incumbent is ‘altruistic’ and values social welfare even when not in power, she partly internalizes this latter effect. The impact of conformism is then non monotonous.
date: 2022
date_type: published
publisher: Springer Verlag
id_number: 10.1007/s00355-022-01391-w
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/126645
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: Conformity
keywords: Pandering
keywords: Incumbency advantage
keywords: Signaling
keywords: Inefficient persistence
language: en
has_fulltext: FALSE
doi: 10.1007/s00355-022-01391-w
subjectsJEL: JEL_D72
subjectsJEL: JEL_D82
view_date_year: 2022
full_text_status: none
publication: Social Choice and Welfare
volume: vol. 59
pagerange: 207-249
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0176-1714
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:126645
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn
harvester_local_overwrite: pending
harvester_local_overwrite: note
harvester_local_overwrite: volume
harvester_local_overwrite: issn
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid
harvester_local_overwrite: publisher
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_id
harvester_local_overwrite: hal_id
harvester_local_overwrite: hal_version
harvester_local_overwrite: hal_url
harvester_local_overwrite: hal_passwd
harvester_local_overwrite: creators_affiliation
oai_lastmod: 2024-04-16T12:15:54Z
oai_set: tse
site: ut1
hal_id: hal-03799069
hal_passwd: 4xznsp
hal_version: 1
hal_url: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03799069
citation:   Aubert, Cécile <https://www.idref.fr/07594717X> and Ding, Huihui  (2022) Voter conformism and inefficient policies.    Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59.  pp. 207-249.