RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1111/iere.12570
A1 Attar, Andrea
A1 Mariotti, Thomas
A1 Salanié, François
T1 Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection
JF International Economic Review
YR 2022
FD 2022-08
VO vol. 63
IS n° 3
SP 981
OP 1020
K1 Insurance Markets
K1 Regulation
K1 Multiple Contracting
K1 Adverse Selection.
AB We study insurance markets in which privately informed consumers can purchase coverage from several firms whose pricing strategies are subject to an anti-dumping regulation. The resulting regulated game supports a single allocation in which each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This competitive allocation cannot be Pareto-improved by a social planner who can neither observe consumer types nor monitor their trades with firms. Accordingly, we argue that public intervention under multiple contracting and adverse selection should penalize firms that cross-subsidize between contracts, while leaving consumers free to choose their preferred amount of coverage.
SN 0020-6598
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/44168/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/126355