%0 Report
%9 Working Paper
%A Larionov, Daniil
%A Pham, Thi-Hien
%A Yamashita, Takuro
%A Zhu, Shuguang
%B TSE Working Paper
%C Toulouse, France
%D 2022
%F publications:43995
%I Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
%T First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition
%U https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43995/
%V 21-1261
%X We study a mechanism design model with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and I ≥ 4 agents. The principal and the agents share a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states of the world. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire information about the state of the world by privately designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is pairwise independent from the state of the world, we show that there exists a mecha-nism which allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents.