@techreport{publications43995,
          volume = {21-1261},
           month = {April},
          author = {Daniil Larionov and Thi-Hien Pham and Takuro Yamashita and Shuguang Zhu},
          series = {TSE Working Paper},
       booktitle = {TSE Working Paper},
            type = {Working Paper},
         address = {Toulouse, France},
           title = {First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition},
       publisher = {TSE Working Paper},
            year = {2022},
     institution = {Universit{\'e} Toulouse 1 Capitole},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43995/},
        abstract = {We study a mechanism design model with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and I {$\ge$} 4 agents. The principal and the agents share a common prior over the set of payoff-relevant states of the world. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire information about the state of the world by privately designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is pairwise independent from the state of the world, we show that there exists a mecha-nism which allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents.}
}