TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse, France
ID  - publications43614
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/125695
A1  - Cremer, Helmuth
A1  - Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie
Y1  - 2021/05//
N2  - This paper studies a market for a medical product in which there is perfect competition among health insurers, while the good is sold by a monopolist. Individuals di¤er in their severity of illness and there is ex post moral hazard. We consider two regimes : one in which insurers use coinsurance rates (ad valorem reimbursements) and one in which insurers use copayments (specic reimbursements). We show that the induced equilibrium with copayments involves a lower producer price and a higher level of wel- fare for consumers. This results provides strong support for a reference price based reimbursement policy.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - Ex post moral hazard
KW  - health insurance competition
KW  - copayments
KW  - imper-
KW  - fect competition
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Coinsurance vs. copayments : reimbursement rules for a monopolistic medical product with competitive health insurers
AV  - public
EP  - 17
ER  -