eprintid: 43507 rev_number: 30 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/04/35/07 datestamp: 2021-09-24 13:23:27 lastmod: 2023-11-30 07:47:08 status_changed: 2023-11-30 07:47:08 type: article metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Bhandari, Abhit creators_name: Larreguy, Horacio creators_name: Marshall, John creators_id: ab3901@columbia.edu creators_id: hlarreguy@fas.harvard.edu creators_id: jm4401@columbia.edu creators_idrefppn: 257521755 creators_idrefppn: 257521666 creators_affiliation: Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse creators_affiliation: Harvard University; Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse;Toulouse School of Economics creators_halaffid: 506116 creators_halaffid: 506116;1002422 title: Able and Mostly Willing: An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter‐Driven Accountability in Senegal ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: Political accountability may be constrained by the reach and relevance of information campaigns in developing democracies and—upon receiving information—voters' ability and will to hold politicians accountable. To illuminate voter‐level constraints and information relevance absent dissemination constraints, we conducted a field experiment around Senegal's 2017 parliamentary elections to examine the core theoretical steps linking receiving different types of incumbent performance information to electoral and nonelectoral accountability. Voters immediately processed information as Bayesians, found temporally benchmarked local performance outcomes particularly informative, and updated their beliefs for at least a month. Learning that incumbents generally performed better than expected, voters durably requested greater politician contact after elections while incumbent vote choice increased among likely voters and voters prioritizing local projects when appraising incumbents. In contrast, information about incumbent duties did not systematically influence beliefs or accountability. These findings suggest voters were able and mostly willing to use relevant information to hold politicians to account. date: 2023-10 date_type: published publisher: Wiley id_number: 10.1111/ajps.12591 official_url: http://iast.fr/pub/125556 faculty: tse divisions: tse language: en has_fulltext: FALSE doi: 10.1111/ajps.12591 view_date_year: 2023 full_text_status: none publication: American Journal of Political Science volume: vol. 67 number: n° 4 pagerange: 1040-1066 refereed: TRUE issn: 1540-5907 oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:125556 harvester_local_overwrite: pending harvester_local_overwrite: note harvester_local_overwrite: publisher harvester_local_overwrite: ispublished harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn harvester_local_overwrite: hal_id harvester_local_overwrite: hal_version harvester_local_overwrite: hal_url harvester_local_overwrite: hal_passwd harvester_local_overwrite: number harvester_local_overwrite: volume harvester_local_overwrite: date harvester_local_overwrite: pagerange harvester_local_overwrite: creators_id oai_lastmod: 2023-11-29T07:10:36Z oai_set: tse site: ut1 hal_id: hal-03354024 hal_passwd: oone04 hal_version: 1 hal_url: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03354024 citation: Bhandari, Abhit , Larreguy, Horacio and Marshall, John (2023) Able and Mostly Willing: An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter‐Driven Accountability in Senegal. American Journal of Political Science, vol. 67 (n° 4). pp. 1040-1066.