RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1111/ajps.12591
A1 Bhandari, Abhit
A1 Larreguy, Horacio
A1 Marshall, John
T1 Able and Mostly Willing: An Empirical Anatomy of Information's Effect on Voter‐Driven Accountability in Senegal
JF American Journal of Political Science
YR 2023
FD 2023-10
VO vol. 67
IS n° 4
SP 1040
OP 1066
AB Political accountability may be constrained by the reach and relevance of information campaigns in developing democracies and—upon receiving information—voters' ability and will to hold politicians accountable. To illuminate voter‐level constraints and information relevance absent dissemination constraints, we conducted a field experiment around Senegal's 2017 parliamentary elections to examine the core theoretical steps linking receiving different types of incumbent performance information to electoral and nonelectoral accountability. Voters immediately processed information as Bayesians, found temporally benchmarked local performance outcomes particularly informative, and updated their beliefs for at least a month. Learning that incumbents generally performed better than expected, voters durably requested greater politician contact after elections while incumbent vote choice increased among likely voters and voters prioritizing local projects when appraising incumbents. In contrast, information about incumbent duties did not systematically influence beliefs or accountability. These findings suggest voters were able and mostly willing to use relevant information to hold politicians to account.
PB Wiley
SN 1540-5907
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/43507/
UL http://iast.fr/pub/125556