eprintid: 41893 rev_number: 27 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/04/18/93 datestamp: 2020-11-26 15:08:48 lastmod: 2023-09-15 14:25:08 status_changed: 2023-09-15 14:25:08 type: monograph metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Love, Brian creators_name: Lefouili, Yassine creators_name: Helmers, Christian creators_idrefppn: 09100795X creators_idrefppn: 252487095 creators_halaffid: 1002422 title: Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: To what extent and with what effect do owners of standard-essential patents (SEPs) “hold-up” companies that produce standard-compliant products? To explore this question, we construct measures of opportunistic patent licensing behaviors using detailed information collected from the dockets of U.S. patent cases filed (2010-2019) to enforce SEPs and a matched sample of non-SEPs. Overall, we find evidence of opportunistic behavior by the patent enforcer in approximately 77% of SEP and 65% of non-SEP assertions in court. The figures mask important heterogeneity. There is significantly more opportunistic conduct aimed at increasing a potential licensee’s loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court: 35% of SEP assertions vs. 10% of non-SEP assertions. In contrast, conduct that increases a potential licensee’s litigation costs is less common and the difference between SEP assertions (8%) and non-SEP assertions (6%) is small. We also show that opportunistic behavior is associated with case outcomes, with the effect on settlement depending on the type of opportunistic behavior. Behavior that increases a potential licensee’s litigation costs is associated with an increase in the probability of settlement, while behavior that increases a potential licensee’s loss if the patent enforcer prevails in court is negatively associated with settlement. date: 2020-11 date_type: published publisher: TSE Working Paper official_url: https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2020/wp_tse_1160.pdf faculty: tse divisions: tse keywords: Litigation, standards, patents, holdup, U.S. language: en has_fulltext: TRUE subjectsJEL: JEL_K41 subjectsJEL: JEL_O30 view_date_year: 2020 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper series: TSE Working Paper volume: 20-1160 place_of_pub: Toulouse pages: 69 institution: Université Toulouse Capitole department: Toulouse School of Economics book_title: TSE Working Paper oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:124914 harvester_local_overwrite: faculty harvester_local_overwrite: pending harvester_local_overwrite: department harvester_local_overwrite: pages harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub harvester_local_overwrite: institution harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn harvester_local_overwrite: official_url harvester_local_overwrite: abstract harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid oai_lastmod: 2023-09-11T09:41:56Z oai_set: tse site: ut1 citation: Love, Brian, Lefouili, Yassine and Helmers, Christian (2020) Do Standard-Essential Patent Owners Behave Opportunistically? Evidence from U.S. District Court Dockets. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1160, Toulouse document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41893/1/wp_tse_1160.pdf