RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Bowles, Jeremy
A1 Larreguy, Horacio
A1 Woller, Anders
T1 Information Versus Control: The Electoral Consequences of Polling Place Creation
YR 2020
FD 2020-09
VO 20-113
SP 64
K1 electoral administration manipulation, turnout buying
AB We examine the incentives incumbents face when creating new polling  places. First, doing so improves incumbents’ ability to monitor brokers  and voters by reducing the number of registered voters per polling station. Second, it reduces the distance traveled by citizens to vote, which undercuts incumbents’ ability to control the electorate via turnout buying. We evaluate this trade-off in the context of Uganda, where the incumbent significantly influences electoral administration. Drawing on rich administrative data, we leverage discontinuities in the creation of polling places to causally identify the independent effects of the number of voters per polling station and distance to vote on electoral outcomes. We find that decreasing improves incumbent electoral outcomes, while reducing  worsens them. The benefits for incumbent outweigh the costs, which rationalizes recent developments to expand polling infrastructure in Uganda and elsewhere.
T2 IAST working paper
PB IAST working paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41838/
UL http://iast.fr/pub/124776