eprintid: 41738
rev_number: 8
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/04/17/38
datestamp: 2020-08-31 13:49:16
lastmod: 2021-04-01 08:10:38
status_changed: 2020-08-31 13:49:16
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Guo, Yingni
creators_name: Hörner, Johannes
creators_idrefppn: 126857253
creators_affiliation: Yale; Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
creators_halaffid: 1002422 ; 441569
title: Dynamic Allocation without Money
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The agent’s value evolves according to a two-state Markov chain. The designer uses future allocation decisions to elicit private information. We solve for the optimal allocation mechanism. Unlike with transfers, efficiency decreases over time. In the long run, polarization occurs. A simple implementation is provided. The agent is endowed with a “quantified entitlement,” corresponding to the number of units he is entitled to claim in a row.
date: 2020-08
date_type: published
publisher: TSE Working Paper
official_url: https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2020/wp_tse_1133.pdf
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: mechanism design
keywords: principal-agent
keywords: quota mechanism
keywords: token budget
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_C73
subjectsJEL: JEL_D82
view_date_year: 2020
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
series: TSE Working Paper
volume: 20-1133
place_of_pub: Toulouse
pages: 64
institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
department: Toulouse school of economics
book_title: TSE Working Paper
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:124604
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oai_lastmod: 2020-08-27T08:32:43Z
oai_set: tse
site: ut1
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hal_id: hal-03187506
hal_passwd: r6u&7ln
hal_version: 1
hal_url: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03187506
citation:   Guo, Yingni and Hörner, Johannes <https://www.idref.fr/126857253>  (2020) Dynamic Allocation without Money.  TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1133, Toulouse     
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/41738/1/wp_tse_1133.pdf