TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications41738
UR  - https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2020/wp_tse_1133.pdf
A1  - Guo, Yingni
A1  - Hörner, Johannes
Y1  - 2020/08//
N2  - We analyze the optimal design of dynamic mechanisms in the absence of transfers. The agent’s value evolves according to a two-state Markov chain. The designer uses future allocation decisions to elicit private information. We solve for the optimal allocation mechanism. Unlike with transfers, efficiency decreases over time. In the long run, polarization occurs. A simple implementation is provided. The agent is endowed with a “quantified entitlement,” corresponding to the number of units he is entitled to claim in a row.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - mechanism design
KW  - principal-agent
KW  - quota mechanism
KW  - token budget
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Dynamic Allocation without Money
AV  - public
EP  - 64
ER  -