TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications41737
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/124603
A1  - Hörner, Johannes
A1  - Klein, Nicolas
A1  - Rady, Sven
Y1  - 2020/08//
N2  - This paper considers a class of experimentation games with L´evy bandits encompassing those of Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005). Its main result is that efficient (perfect Bayesian) equilibria exist whenever players’ payoffs have a diffusion component. Hence, the trade-offs emphasized in the literature do not rely on the intrinsic nature of bandit models but on the commonly adopted solution concept (MPE). This is not an artifact of continuous time: we prove that such equilibria arise as limits of equilibria in the discretetime game. Furthermore, it suffices to relax the solution concept to strongly symmetric equilibrium.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - Two-Armed Bandit
KW  - Bayesian Learning
KW  - Strategic Experimentation
KW  - Strongly Symmetric Equilibrium.
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games
AV  - public
EP  - 60
ER  -