%S TSE Working Paper
%A Jean-Paul Azam
%T Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated, and What to Do About It
%X This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce terrorism under some parameter restrictions.
%K Terrorism – Education – Development
%K Terrorisme – Education – Développement
%B TSE Working Paper
%V 10-230
%D 2010
%C Toulouse
%I TSE Working Paper
%L publications3568