TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications3568
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/24339
A1  - Azam, Jean-Paul
Y1  - 2010/12//
N2  - This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce terrorism under some parameter restrictions.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - Terrorism – Education – Development
KW  - Terrorisme – Education – Développement
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Why Suicide-Terrorists Get Educated, and What to Do About It
AV  - public
EP  - 30
ER  -