TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications34715
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/124213
A1  - Doligalski, Pawel
A1  - Ndiaye, Abdoulaye
A1  - Werquin, Nicolas
Y1  - 2020/05//
N2  - Half of the jobs in the U.S. feature pay-for-performance. We study nonlinear income taxation in a model where such contracts arise in private labor markets that are
constrained by moral hazard frictions. We derive novel formulas for the incidence of
arbitrarily nonlinear reforms of any given tax code on both the mean of earnings and
their sensitivity to performance. We show theoretically and quantitatively that, follow-
ing an increase in tax progressivity, the higher performance-sensitivity caused by the
crowding-out of insurance provided by firms is almost fully offset by a countervailing
performance-pay effect driven by labor supply responses. As a result, earnings risk
is hardly affected by policy. We then turn to the normative analysis of a government
that levies taxes and transfers to redistribute income across workers with different levels of uninsurable productivity. We find that setting taxes without accounting for the endogeneity of private insurance is close to optimal. Thus, the common concern that standard models of taxation underestimate the cost of redistribution is, in the context of performance-based compensation, overblown.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Redistribution with Performance Pay
AV  - public
EP  - 87
ER  -