RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Treich, Nicolas
A1 Salanié, François
T1 Public and private incentives for self-protection
YR 2020
FD 2020-04
VO 20-1090
SP 10
AB Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask when going outside during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective  offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. Yet, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/34707/
UL https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2020/wp_tse_1090.pdf