TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications34707
UR  - https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2020/wp_tse_1090.pdf
A1  - Treich, Nicolas
A1  - Salanié, François
Y1  - 2020/04//
N2  - Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask when going outside during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective
offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. Yet, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Public and private incentives for self-protection
AV  - public
EP  - 10
ER  -