relation: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/34707/ title: Public and private incentives for self-protection creator: Treich, Nicolas creator: Salanié, François subject: B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE description: Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask when going outside during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. Yet, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner. publisher: TSE Working Paper date: 2020-04 type: Monograph type: NonPeerReviewed format: text language: en identifier: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/34707/1/wp_tse_1090.pdf identifier: Treich, Nicolas and Salanié, François (2020) Public and private incentives for self-protection. TSE Working Paper, n. 20-1090, Toulouse relation: https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2020/wp_tse_1090.pdf language: en