@techreport{publications34707,
          volume = {20-1090},
           month = {April},
          author = {Nicolas Treich and Fran{\cc}ois Salani{\'e}},
          series = {TSE Working Paper},
       booktitle = {TSE Working Paper},
            type = {Working Paper},
         address = {Toulouse},
           title = {Public and private incentives for self-protection},
       publisher = {TSE Working Paper},
            year = {2020},
     institution = {Universit{\'e} Toulouse 1 Capitole},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/34707/},
        abstract = {Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask when going outside during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a ?collective
offsetting effect?, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. Yet, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.}
}