%0 Report
%9 Working Paper
%A Iossa, Elisabetta
%A Loertscher, Simon
%A Marx, Leslie M.
%A Rey, Patrick
%B TSE Working Paper
%C Toulouse
%D 2020
%F publications:34564
%I Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
%K synchronized vs staggered purchasing
%K sustainability and initiation of collusion
%K coordinated effects
%T Collusive market allocations
%U https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/34564/
%V 20-1084
%X Collusive schemes by suppliers often take the form of allocating customers or  markets among cartel members. We analyze incentives for suppliers to initiate  and sustain such a collusive schemes in a repeated procurement setting. We show  that, contrary to some prevailing beliefs, staggered (versus synchronized) purchasing does not make collusion more difficult to sustain or initiate. Buyer defensive  measures include synchronized rather than staggered purchasing, first-price rather  than second-price auctions, more aggressive or secrete reserve prices, longer contract  lengths, withholding information, and avoiding observable registration procedures.  Inefficiency induced by defensive measures is an often unrecognized social cost of  collusive conduct.