%A Martin Boyer
%A Philippe De Donder
%A Claude-Denys Fluet
%A Marie-Louise Leroux
%A Pierre-Carl Michaud
%J American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
%T Long-term care insurance : information frictions and selection
%X This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against nancial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.
%N n° 3
%K Long-term care insurance,adverse selection , stated-preference, health, insurance
%P 134-169
%V vol. 12
%D 2020
%I American Economic Association
%R 10.1257/pol.20180227
%L publications32900