RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1257/pol.20180227
A1 Boyer, Martin
A1 De Donder, Philippe
A1 Fluet, Claude-Denys
A1 Leroux, Marie-Louise
A1 Michaud, Pierre-Carl
T1 Long-term care insurance : information frictions and selection
JF American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
YR 2020
FD 2020-08
VO vol. 12
IS n° 3
SP 134
OP 169
K1 Long-term care insurance,adverse selection , stated-preference, health, insurance
AB This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against nancial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.
PB American Economic Association
SN 1945-7731
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32900/
UL https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2019/wp_tse_1034.pdf