TY  - JOUR
ID  - publications32900
UR  - https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2019/wp_tse_1034.pdf
IS  - n° 3
A1  - Boyer, Martin
A1  - De Donder, Philippe
A1  - Fluet, Claude-Denys
A1  - Leroux, Marie-Louise
A1  - Michaud, Pierre-Carl
N2  - This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against nancial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.
VL  - vol. 12
TI  - Long-term care insurance : information frictions and selection
AV  - public
EP  - 169
Y1  - 2020/08//
PB  - American Economic Association
JF  - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
KW  - Long-term care insurance,adverse selection , stated-preference, health, insurance
SN  - 1945-7731
SP  - 134
ER  -