%0 Journal Article
%@ 1945-7731
%A Boyer, Martin
%A De Donder, Philippe
%A Fluet, Claude-Denys
%A Leroux, Marie-Louise
%A Michaud, Pierre-Carl
%D 2020
%F publications:32900
%I American Economic Association
%J American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
%K Long-term care insurance,adverse selection , stated-preference, health, insurance
%N n° 3
%P 134-169
%R 10.1257/pol.20180227
%T Long-term care insurance : information frictions and selection
%U https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32900/
%V vol. 12
%X This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against nancial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.