RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1111/joie.12228
A1 Bardey, David
A1 Gromb, Denis Emmanuel
A1 Martimort, David
A1 Pouyet, Jérôme
T1 Controlling sellers who provide advice: regulation and competition
JF Journal of Industrial Economics
YR 2020
FD 2020-09
VO vol. 68
IS n° 3
SP 409
OP 444
AB A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e., within an implementability cone. The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information-collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed rewards respectively. This no longer holds when the seller has private information about costs as both problems interact. We study whether competition and the threat by buyers to switch sellers can substitute for regulation
PB Blackwell Publishing
SN 0022-1821
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32694/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/123306