RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1080/14735903.2019.1655191
A1 Cornière, Alexandre de
A1 Taylor, Greg
T1 A model of biased intermediation
JF RAND Journal of Economics
YR 2019
FD 2019
VO vol. 50
IS n° 4
SP 854
OP 882
AB We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary�s advice  when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers� and consumers�  payo?s can be congruent or con?icting, and show that this has important implications  for the e?ects of bias. Under congruence, the ?rm bene?ting from bias has an incentive  to o?er a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-o? than under no  bias. Under con?ict, the favored ?rm o?ers lower utility and bias harms consumers.  We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their e?cacy also  depends on whether the payo?s exhibit congruence or con?ict.
PB Rand corp
SN 0741-6261
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32644/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/123219