RT Journal Article SR 00 ID 10.1080/14735903.2019.1655191 A1 Cornière, Alexandre de A1 Taylor, Greg T1 A model of biased intermediation JF RAND Journal of Economics YR 2019 FD 2019 VO vol. 50 IS n° 4 SP 854 OP 882 AB We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary�s advice when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers� and consumers� payo?s can be congruent or con?icting, and show that this has important implications for the e?ects of bias. Under congruence, the ?rm bene?ting from bias has an incentive to o?er a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-o? than under no bias. Under con?ict, the favored ?rm o?ers lower utility and bias harms consumers. We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their e?cacy also depends on whether the payo?s exhibit congruence or con?ict. PB Rand corp SN 0741-6261 LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32644/ UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/123219