TY - JOUR ID - publications32644 UR - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/123219 IS - n° 4 A1 - Cornière, Alexandre de A1 - Taylor, Greg Y1 - 2019/// N2 - We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary�s advice when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers� and consumers� payo?s can be congruent or con?icting, and show that this has important implications for the e?ects of bias. Under congruence, the ?rm bene?ting from bias has an incentive to o?er a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-o? than under no bias. Under con?ict, the favored ?rm o?ers lower utility and bias harms consumers. We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their e?cacy also depends on whether the payo?s exhibit congruence or con?ict. PB - Rand corp JF - RAND Journal of Economics VL - vol. 50 SN - 0741-6261 TI - A model of biased intermediation SP - 854 AV - public EP - 882 ER -