TY  - JOUR
ID  - publications32644
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/123219
IS  - n° 4
A1  - Cornière, Alexandre de
A1  - Taylor, Greg
Y1  - 2019///
N2  - We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary�s advice
when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers� and consumers�
payo?s can be congruent or con?icting, and show that this has important implications
for the e?ects of bias. Under congruence, the ?rm bene?ting from bias has an incentive
to o?er a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-o? than under no
bias. Under con?ict, the favored ?rm o?ers lower utility and bias harms consumers.
We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their e?cacy also
depends on whether the payo?s exhibit congruence or con?ict.
PB  - Rand corp
JF  - RAND Journal of Economics
VL  - vol. 50
SN  - 0741-6261
TI  - A model of biased intermediation
SP  - 854
AV  - public
EP  - 882
ER  -