RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Moinas, Sophie
A1 Pouget, Sébastien
T1 Rational and Irrational Bubbles: an Experiment
YR 2009
FD 2009-05
VO 09-045
AB This paper proposes a theory of rational bubbles in an economy with finite trading opportunities. Bubbles arise because agents are never sure to be last in the market sequence. This theory is used to design an experimental setting in which bubbles can be made rational or irrational by varying one parameter. This complements the experimental literature on irrational bubbles initiated by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). Our experimental results suggest that it is pretty difficult to coordinate on rational bubbles even in an environment where irrational bubbles flourish. Maximum likelihood estimations show that these results can be reconciled within the context of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004)'s cognitive hierarchy model, and Mc Kelvey and Palfrey (1995)'s quantal response equilibrium.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/3258/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/21929