eprintid: 32375 rev_number: 35 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/03/23/75 datestamp: 2019-04-26 07:24:34 lastmod: 2021-06-17 15:16:55 status_changed: 2021-06-17 15:16:55 type: monograph metadata_visibility: no_search creators_name: Borsenberger, Claire creators_name: Cremer, Helmuth creators_name: Joram, Denis creators_name: Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie creators_name: Malavolti, Estelle creators_idrefppn: 058708928 creators_idrefppn: 058485376 creators_idrefppn: 179825933 creators_idrefppn: 070400318 creators_affiliation: Toulouse School of Economics creators_affiliation: Toulouse School of Economics creators_affiliation: Toulouse School of Economics creators_halaffid: 1002422 creators_halaffid: 1002422 creators_halaffid: 1002422 title: Platform competition: market structure and pricing ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: We consider an e-commerce sector with two retailers (which may be marketplaces) and two delivery operators. Products are differentiated according to the retailer and the mode of delivery. The representation of product differentiation is inspired by the Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (2002) discrete choice model. We examine vertical integration of a retailer/ delivery operator pair. Vertical restraints like bundling and/or foreclosure are then considered on top of the integration. Vertical integration in itself eliminates double marginalization, which enhances consumerswelfare. On the other hand, it reduces product variety, and the market power it conveys is likely to reduce profits of the remaining firms. Bundling or foreclosure can be expected to further exacerbate these negative effects. Our most remarkable result is that vertical integration of a single retailer/operator pair will lead to bundling and foreclosure, and possibly the complete exit of the remaining retailers and operators. This is true even when no explicit bundling or foreclosure is put in place on an a priori basis. Consequently, a competition authority that is concerned with total welfare, should not allow the initial merger. date: 2019-04 date_type: published publisher: TSE Working Paper official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/122941 faculty: tse divisions: tse keywords: E-commerce keywords: delivery operators keywords: vertical integration keywords: bundling keywords: foreclosure language: en has_fulltext: TRUE view_date_year: 2019 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper series: TSE Working Paper volume: 19-1010 place_of_pub: Toulouse pages: 26 institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole department: Toulouse School of economics book_title: TSE Working Paper oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:122941 harvester_local_overwrite: department harvester_local_overwrite: faculty harvester_local_overwrite: abstract harvester_local_overwrite: creators_affiliation harvester_local_overwrite: institution harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub harvester_local_overwrite: pages harvester_local_overwrite: pending harvester_local_overwrite: publish_to_hal harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid oai_lastmod: 2021-06-04T12:16:36Z oai_set: tse site: ut1 publish_to_hal: FALSE citation: Borsenberger, Claire , Cremer, Helmuth , Joram, Denis, Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie and Malavolti, Estelle (2019) Platform competition: market structure and pricing. TSE Working Paper, n. 19-1010, Toulouse document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/32375/1/wp_tse_1010.pdf