TY  - CONF
ID  - publications29519
UR  - https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/29519/
A1  - Elkind, Edith
A1  - Grandi, Umberto
A1  - Rossi, Francesca
A1  - Slinko, Arkadii
Y1  - 2015///
N2  - The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators-voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote. In this paper, we ask what happens if a given profile admits several such voters. We model strategic interactions among Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulators as a normal-form game. We classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise in this setting for two simple voting rules, namely Plurality and Borda, and study the complexity of determining whether a given manipulative vote weakly dominates truth-telling, as well as existence of Nash equilibria.
PB  - AAAI Press
KW  - Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
TI  - Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games
SP  - 533
AV  - public
EP  - 539
T2  - 24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015)
ER  -