@inproceedings{publications29519,
       booktitle = {24th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015)},
           title = {Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games},
          author = {Edith Elkind and Umberto Grandi and Francesca Rossi and Arkadii Slinko},
       publisher = {AAAI Press},
            year = {2015},
           pages = {533--539},
        keywords = {Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/29519/},
        abstract = {The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators-voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote. In this paper, we ask what happens if a given profile admits several such voters. We model strategic interactions among Gibbard-Satterthwaite manipulators as a normal-form game. We classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise in this setting for two simple voting rules, namely Plurality and Borda, and study the complexity of determining whether a given manipulative vote weakly dominates truth-telling, as well as existence of Nash equilibria.}
}