RT Conference Proceedings
SR 00
A1 Grandi, Umberto
A1 Lorini, Emiliano
A1 Novaro, Arianna
A1 Perrussel, Laurent
T1 Strategic disclosure of opinions on a social network
YR 2017
FD 8 May 2017 - 12 May 2017
SP 1196
OP 1204
K1 Opinion diffusion - Nash equilibria - Strategic reasoning - Social infuence
AB This paper starts from a simple model of strategic reasoning in situations of social influence. Agents express binary views on a set of propositions, and iteratively update their views by taking into account the expressed opinion of their influencers. We empower agents with the ability to disclose or hide their opinions, in order to attain a predetermined goal. We study classical game-theoretic solution concepts in the resulting games, observing a non-trivial interplay between the individual goals and the structure of the underlying network. By making use of different logics for strategic reasoning, we show how apparently simple problems in strategic opinion diffusion require a complex logical machinery to be properly formalized and handled.
T2 16th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2017)
ED Sao Paulo
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/28657/