RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Yamashita, Takuro
T1 Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information
YR 2018
FD 2018-07
VO 18-937
SP 51
K1 Mechanism design
K1 Auction
K1 Correlated private information
K1 Information acquisition
K1 Revenue guarantee
AB This paper considers auction environments with a (possibly correlated) common prior over bidders' values, where each bidder may have additional information (e.g., through information acquisition). Under certain conditions, we characterize the optimal mechanisms in terms of the expected revenue that is guaranteed given whatever additional information is available to the bidders. Even if the values are correlated,we do not necessarily have full-surplus extraction, and moreover, the optimal mechanism resembles those in the independently distributed cases. Specifically, we show that (i) a second-price auction is optimal among all the efficient mechanisms, and (ii) it is rate-optimal among all the mechanisms.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/26151/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32880