%S TSE Working Paper
%A Bruno Jullien
%A Markus Reisinger
%A Patrick Rey
%T Vertical Foreclosure and Multi-Segment Competition
%X This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We  first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tari¤s, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.
%K Foreclosure
%K Vertical Contracting
%K Customer Segments
%K Downstream Competition
%B TSE Working Paper
%V 17-876
%D 2017
%C Toulouse
%I TSE Working Paper
%L publications25799