RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Jullien, Bruno
A1 Reisinger, Markus
A1 Rey, Patrick
T1 Vertical Foreclosure and Multi-Segment Competition
YR 2017
FD 2017-12-15
VO 17-876
SP 13
K1 Foreclosure
K1 Vertical Contracting
K1 Customer Segments
K1 Downstream Competition
AB This paper analyzes a supplier's incentives to foreclose downstream entry when entrants have stronger positions in different market segments, thus bringing added value as well as competition. We  first consider the case where wholesale contracts take the form of linear tariffs, and characterize the conditions under which the competition-intensifying effect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tari¤s, even coupled with additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25799/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32305