eprintid: 25703 rev_number: 5 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/02/57/03 datestamp: 2018-05-16 13:45:56 lastmod: 2021-04-02 15:57:25 status_changed: 2018-05-16 13:45:56 type: article succeeds: 15816 metadata_visibility: show creators_name: Boyer, Marcel creators_name: Kotchoni, Rachidi creators_idrefppn: 121383830 title: How Much Do Cartels Overcharge? ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: Connor and Lande (Issues in competition law and policy, pp 2203–2218, 2008) conducted a survey of cartels and found a mean overcharge estimate in the range of 31–49 %. By examining more sources, Connor (Price-fixing overcharges, 2nd edn. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1610262, 2010) finds a mean of 50.4 % for successful cartels. However, the data that are used in those studies are estimates that are obtained from different methodologies, sources, and contexts rather than from direct observation. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates that provides a sound treatment of these matters and other data problems. We find a bias-corrected mean and median overcharge estimate of 15.47 and 16.01 %. Our results have significant antitrust policy implications. date: 2015-09 date_type: published publisher: Kluwer official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/32076 faculty: tse divisions: tse keywords: Antitrust keywords: Cartel overcharges keywords: Heckman correction keywords: Antitrust Cartel overcharges keywords: Kullback–Leibler divergence keywords: Meta-analysis language: en has_fulltext: FALSE view_date_year: 2015 full_text_status: none publication: Review of Industrial Organization volume: 47 number: 2 pagerange: 119-153 refereed: TRUE issn: 0889-938X oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:32076 harvester_local_overwrite: issn harvester_local_overwrite: faculty harvester_local_overwrite: publisher harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn oai_lastmod: 2018-03-16T08:57:37Z oai_set: tse site: ut1 citation: Boyer, Marcel and Kotchoni, Rachidi (2015) How Much Do Cartels Overcharge? Review of Industrial Organization, 47 (2). pp. 119-153.