RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1016/j.irle.2014.12.004
A1 Allain, Marie-Laure
A1 Boyer, Marcel
A1 Kotchoni, Rachidi
A1 Ponssard, Jean-Pierre
T1 Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union
JF International Review of Law and Economics
YR 2015
FD 2015-06
VO 42
SP 38
OP 47
AB Deterring the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of antitrust policy. We develop a dynamic framework to characterize the compensation and deterrence properties of fines, based on the fact that cartel stability depends on the ability to prevent deviation, which itself depends in part on fines imposed in case of detection and conviction. We show that the proper consideration of cartel dynamics plays a major role in determining optimal deterrent fines. Our results suggest that fines imposed by the European Commission in recent years meet the deterrence objective in a significant number of cases.
PB Elsevier
SN 1873-6394
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25645/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31921