TY  - JOUR
ID  - publications25645
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31921
A1  - Allain, Marie-Laure
A1  - Boyer, Marcel
A1  - Kotchoni, Rachidi
A1  - Ponssard, Jean-Pierre
Y1  - 2015/06//
N2  - Deterring the formation or continuation of cartels is a major objective of antitrust policy. We develop a dynamic framework to characterize the compensation and deterrence properties of fines, based on the fact that cartel stability depends on the ability to prevent deviation, which itself depends in part on fines imposed in case of detection and conviction. We show that the proper consideration of cartel dynamics plays a major role in determining optimal deterrent fines. Our results suggest that fines imposed by the European Commission in recent years meet the deterrence objective in a significant number of cases.
PB  - Elsevier
JF  - International Review of Law and Economics
VL  - 42
SN  - 1873-6394
TI  - Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union
SP  - 38
AV  - none
EP  - 47
ER  -