RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Bontems, Philippe
T1 Refunding Emissions Taxes
YR 2017
FD 2017-06
VO 17-832
SP 25
K1 refunded emission taxes
K1 regulation design
K1 pollution
AB This paper examines theoretically whether by combining both output based refunding and abatement expenditures based refunding it is possible to limit the negative consequences that a pollution tax imply for a polluting industry. We show that this is indeed the case by using a three-part policy where emissions are subject to a fee and where output and abatement expenditures are subsidized. When the industry is homogenous, it is possible to replicate the standard emission tax outcome by inducing a polluting firm to choose the production and emission levels obtained under any emission tax, without departing from budget balance. By construction, any polluter earns strictly more than under the standard tax alone without rebate, making this proposal more acceptable to the industry. When firms are heterogenous, the refunding policy needed to replicate the standard emission tax outcome is personalized in the sense that at least the output subsidy should be type dependent and it is strictly prefered only from the industry's point of view to a standard environmental tax. We also explore the implications of uniform three-part refunding policies for a heterogenous industry.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25643/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31916