eprintid: 25640
rev_number: 4
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/02/56/40
datestamp: 2018-04-16 15:14:14
lastmod: 2018-04-16 15:14:14
status_changed: 2018-04-16 15:14:14
type: monograph
metadata_visibility: no_search
creators_name: Garrett, Daniel F.
title: Dynamic Mechanism Design
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: We study the optimal mechanism in a dynamic sales relationship where the buyerís arrival date is uncertain, and where his value changes stochastically over time. The buyerís arrival date is the Örst date at which contracting is feasible and is his private information. To induce immediate participation, the buyer is granted positive expected rents even if his value at arrival is the lowest possible. The buyer is punished for arriving late; i.e., he expects to earn less of the surplus. Optimal allocations for a late arriver are also further distorted below Örst-best levels. Conditions are provided under which allocations converge to the e¢ cient ones long enough after contracting, and this convergence occurs irrespective of the time the contract is initially agreed (put di§erently, the so-called "principle of vanishing distortions" introduced by Battaglini (2005) continues to apply irrespective of the buyerís arrival date).
date: 2017-06
date_type: published
publisher: TSE Working Paper
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31911
sub_title: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
keywords: dynamic mechanism design
keywords: dynamic arrivals
keywords: stochastic process
language: en
has_fulltext: TRUE
subjectsJEL: JEL_D82
view_date_year: 2017
full_text_status: public
monograph_type: working_paper
series: TSE Working Paper
volume: 17-830
place_of_pub: Toulouse
pages: 31
institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole
department: Toulouse School of economics
book_title: TSE Working Paper
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:31911
harvester_local_overwrite: department
harvester_local_overwrite: faculty
harvester_local_overwrite: institution
harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub
harvester_local_overwrite: pages
oai_lastmod: 2018-03-28T14:26:08Z
oai_set: tse
site: ut1
citation:   Garrett, Daniel F.  (2017)  Dynamic Mechanism Design: Dynamic Arrivals and Changing Values. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-830, Toulouse     
document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25640/1/final_geb_dynamic_arrivals.pdf