RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Attar, Andrea
A1 Casamatta, Catherine
A1 Chassagnon, Arnold
A1 Décamps, Jean-Paul
T1 Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders
YR 2017
FD 2017-06
VO 17-821
SP 14
K1 Multiple Lending
K1 Menus
K1 Strategic Default
K1 Common Agency
K1 Bank Competition
AB We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post take-it-or-leave-it offers involves a severe loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25626/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31786