TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications25626
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31786
A1  - Attar, Andrea
A1  - Casamatta, Catherine
A1  - Chassagnon, Arnold
A1  - Décamps, Jean-Paul
Y1  - 2017/06//
N2  - We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post take-it-or-leave-it offers involves a severe loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - Multiple Lending
KW  - Menus
KW  - Strategic Default
KW  - Common Agency
KW  - Bank Competition
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders
AV  - public
EP  - 14
ER  -