@techreport{publications25626,
          volume = {17-821},
           month = {June},
          author = {Andrea Attar and Catherine Casamatta and Arnold Chassagnon and Jean-Paul D{\'e}camps},
          series = {TSE Working Paper},
       booktitle = {TSE Working Paper},
            type = {Working Paper},
         address = {Toulouse},
           title = {Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders},
       publisher = {TSE Working Paper},
            year = {2017},
     institution = {Universit{\'e} Toulouse 1 Capitole},
        keywords = {Multiple Lending, Menus, Strategic Default, Common Agency, Bank Competition},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/25626/},
        abstract = {We study a capital market in which multiple lenders sequentially attempt at financing a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post take-it-or-leave-it offers involves a severe loss of generality: none of the equilibrium outcomes arising in this scenario survives if lenders offer menus of contracts. This result challenges the approach followed in standard models of multiple lending. From a theoretical perspective, we offer new insights on equilibrium robustness in sequential common agency games.}
}