RT Monograph
SR 00
A1 Bonatti, Alessandro
A1 Hörner, Johannes
T1 Career Concerns with Exponential Learning
YR 2017
FD 2017-03
VO 17-793
SP 67
K1 career concerns
K1 experimentation
K1 career paths
K1 up-or-out
K1 reputation
AB This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term contracts, effort and wages are single-peaked with seniority, due to the strategic substitutability of effort levels at different times. Both delay and underprovision of effort worsen if effort is observable. Commitment to wages by competing firms mitigates these inefficiencies. In that case, the optimal contract features piecewise constant wages and severance pay.
T2 TSE Working Paper
PB TSE Working Paper
PP Toulouse
AV Published
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23338/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31604