TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications23338
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31604
A1  - Bonatti, Alessandro
A1  - Hörner, Johannes
Y1  - 2017/03//
N2  - This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term contracts, effort and wages are single-peaked with seniority, due to the strategic substitutability of effort levels at different times. Both delay and underprovision of effort worsen if effort is observable. Commitment to wages by competing firms mitigates these inefficiencies. In that case, the optimal contract features piecewise constant wages and severance pay.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - career concerns
KW  - experimentation
KW  - career paths
KW  - up-or-out
KW  - reputation
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Career Concerns with Exponential Learning
AV  - public
EP  - 67
ER  -