eprintid: 23078 rev_number: 24 eprint_status: archive userid: 1482 importid: 105 dir: disk0/00/02/30/78 datestamp: 2017-02-23 16:13:32 lastmod: 2022-04-01 14:04:46 status_changed: 2022-04-01 14:04:46 type: monograph metadata_visibility: no_search creators_name: Cremer, Helmuth creators_name: Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie creators_name: Roeder, Kerstin creators_idrefppn: 058485376 creators_idrefppn: 179825933 creators_halaffid: 1002422 creators_halaffid: 1002422 title: Household bargaining, spouses' consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes ispublished: pub subjects: subjects_ECO abstract: We study the role and structure of commodity taxes when consumption and labor supplies are determined through a bargaining procedure between spouses, and where an optimal income tax is also available. We focus on the question whether there should be differences in tax treatment between "female"and "male" products. When weights (as well as wages) differ across couples, the heterogeneity is multidimensional and the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem does not apply. In addition, when the social welfare function is individual-based, spouses'social weights may differ from their weights within the couples. This brings about Pigouvian considerations which in themselves may justify commodity taxes. We show that the expressions for the tax rates include Pigouvian and incentive terms. Their roles are most apparent in the case where some goods are consumed exclusively by one of the spouses. Supposing, for instance, that the female spouse has the lower bargaining weight, we ?nd conditions under which the Pigouvian term calls for a subsidization of the "female good", and a taxation of the "male good"?. The incentive term depends on the distribution of bargaining weights across couples. For instance, for the exclusive consumption case, when the weight of the female spouse increases with wages, the female good tends to be consumed in larger proportion by more productive couples. Consequently, the incentive term makes it a candidate for taxation. In this case the Pigouvian term is mitigated. date: 2017-02 date_type: published publisher: TSE Working Paper official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31511 faculty: tse divisions: tse keywords: Couples' taxation keywords: household bargaining keywords: optimal commodity taxation language: en has_fulltext: TRUE subjectsJEL: JEL_D10 subjectsJEL: JEL_H21 subjectsJEL: JEL_H31 view_date_year: 2017 full_text_status: public monograph_type: working_paper series: TSE Working Paper volume: 17-767 place_of_pub: Toulouse pages: 29 institution: Université Toulouse 1 Capitole department: Toulouse School of Economics book_title: TSE Working Paper oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:31511 harvester_local_overwrite: oai_set harvester_local_overwrite: department harvester_local_overwrite: faculty harvester_local_overwrite: place_of_pub harvester_local_overwrite: pages harvester_local_overwrite: institution harvester_local_overwrite: publish_to_hal harvester_local_overwrite: pending harvester_local_overwrite: creators_idrefppn harvester_local_overwrite: creators_halaffid oai_lastmod: 2022-03-31T13:56:28Z oai_set: tse oai_set: ut1c site: ut1 publish_to_hal: FALSE citation: Cremer, Helmuth , Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie and Roeder, Kerstin (2017) Household bargaining, spouses' consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes. TSE Working Paper, n. 17-767, Toulouse document_url: https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/23078/1/wp_tse_767.pdf