eprintid: 22535
rev_number: 22
eprint_status: archive
userid: 1482
importid: 105
dir: disk0/00/02/25/35
datestamp: 2016-11-29 10:14:21
lastmod: 2023-11-30 09:49:04
status_changed: 2023-11-30 09:49:04
type: article
succeeds: 15952
metadata_visibility: show
creators_name: Alger, Ingela
creators_name: Weibull, Jörgen W.
creators_idrefppn: 234173319
creators_idrefppn: 034181938
creators_affiliation: Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse;Toulouse School of Economics
creators_affiliation: Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse
title: Evolution and Kantian morality
ispublished: pub
subjects: subjects_ECO
abstract: What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative. Individuals' preferences are their private information. The set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions. We show that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kantian flavor, are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable. We also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of Maynard Smith's and Price's (1973) notion of evolutionary stability of strategies.
date: 2016-07
date_type: published
publisher: Elsevier
id_number: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.006
official_url: http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31226
faculty: tse
divisions: tse
divisions: CRM
keywords: Preference evolution
keywords: Evolutionary stability
keywords: Assortativity
keywords: Morality
keywords: Homo moralis
keywords: Social preferences
language: en
has_fulltext: FALSE
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.006
subjectsJEL: JEL_C73
subjectsJEL: JEL_D01
subjectsJEL: JEL_D03
view_date_year: 2016
full_text_status: none
publication: Games and Economic Behavior
volume: n°98
pagerange: 56-67
refereed: TRUE
issn: 0899-8256
oai_identifier: oai:tse-fr.eu:31226
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oai_lastmod: 2023-11-20T13:11:13Z
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citation:   Alger, Ingela <https://www.idref.fr/234173319> and Weibull, Jörgen W. <https://www.idref.fr/034181938>  (2016) Evolution and Kantian morality.    Games and Economic Behavior, n°98.  pp. 56-67.