RT Journal Article
SR 00
ID 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.006
A1 Alger, Ingela
A1 Weibull, Jörgen W.
T1 Evolution and Kantian morality
JF Games and Economic Behavior
YR 2016
FD 2016-07
VO n°98
SP 56
OP 67
K1 Preference evolution
K1 Evolutionary stability
K1 Assortativity
K1 Morality
K1 Homo moralis
K1 Social preferences
AB What kind of preferences should one expect evolution to favor? We propose a definition of evolutionary stability of preferences in interactions in groups of arbitrary finite size. Groups are formed under random matching that may be assortative. Individuals' preferences are their private information. The set of potential preferences are all those that can be represented by continuous functions. We show that a certain class of such preferences, that combine self-interest with morality of a Kantian flavor, are evolutionarily stable, and that preferences resulting in other behaviors are evolutionarily unstable. We also establish a connection between evolutionary stability of preferences and a generalized version of Maynard Smith's and Price's (1973) notion of evolutionary stability of strategies.
PB Elsevier
SN 0899-8256
LK https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22535/
UL http://tse-fr.eu/pub/31226