TY  - RPRT
CY  - Toulouse
ID  - publications22343
UR  - http://tse-fr.eu/pub/30705
A1  - Jeon, Doh-Shin
A1  - Kim, Byung-Cheol
A1  - Menicucci, Domenico
Y1  - 2016/09//
N2  - We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The
incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with
internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal.
Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling can be optimal due
to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge
from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination and show that prohibiting price discrimination improves
welfare when there is a strong conflict between the two sides.
PB  - TSE Working Paper
T3  - TSE Working Paper
KW  - platform
KW  - price discrimination
KW  - two-sided markets
KW  - non-responsiveness
KW  - spence effect
M1  - working_paper
TI  - Second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform
AV  - public
EP  - 53
ER  -