@techreport{publications22343,
          volume = {16-690},
           month = {September},
          author = {Doh-Shin Jeon and Byung-Cheol Kim and Domenico Menicucci},
          series = {TSE Working Paper},
       booktitle = {TSE Working Paper},
            type = {Working Paper},
         address = {Toulouse},
           title = {Second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform},
       publisher = {TSE Working Paper},
            year = {2016},
     institution = {Universit{\'e} Toulouse 1 Capitole},
        keywords = {platform, price discrimination, two-sided markets, non-responsiveness, spence effect},
             url = {https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/22343/},
        abstract = {We study second-degree price discrimination by a two-sided monopoly platform. The
incentive constraints of the agents on the value creation side may be in conflict with
internalizing externalities on the value capture side, which may render pooling optimal.
Even without such conflict between the two sides, pooling can be optimal due
to type-dependent Spence effects when the preferences of the marginal agents diverge
from those of the average agents on the value capture side. We perform a welfare analysis of price discrimination and show that prohibiting price discrimination improves
welfare when there is a strong conflict between the two sides.}
}